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WATER RIGHTS
So much water around the dam: State streamflow regulation
offederally licensed hydroelectricfacilities
by Robert H. Abrams
State of California
v.
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
and Rock Creek Limited Partnership
(Docket No. 89-333)
Argument Date: March 20, 1990
Congress, in a series of laws dating back to 1920, estab-
lished federal regulatory authority over the construction
and operation of hydroelectric facilities, an authority that
is today vested in the Federal Energy Regulatory Commis-
sion (FERC). In a long-standing ruling on federal regula-
tory power, First Iowa Hydro-Electrtc Cooperative v.
Federal Power Commission, 328 U.S. 152 (1946), the
United States Supreme Court held that the predecessor
agency to FERC enjoyed a power to regulate hydroelec-
tric projects to the exclusion of the states, at least insofar
as a state streamflow regulation conflicts with the terms
of the federal license. In that decision the Court interpreted
narrowly a section of the governing statute that preserved
a degree of concurrent state authority.
In more recent years, the Court has shown a greater
hesitancy to oust state regulatory authority in a variety of
contexts, at least one of which is similar to state stream-
flow regulation of a federal hydropower licensee. In this
case, California challenges the received wisdom of the First
Iowa case and urges that a state in the valid exercise of
its police power should be allowed to assure adequate in-
stream flows to protect fish and wildlife by requiring that
more water bypass the hydroelectric generation facility
than the amount called for in the federal license.
ISSUE
Does section 27 of the Federal Power Act of 1935 (16
U.S.c. § 821 (1982 ed.)) preserve the power of the State of
California to regulate the use of water within its borders
when such regulation will affect the authorized actions of
a federal hydropower licensee?
Robert H. Abrams is a professor of law at Wayne State




In 1982 a partnership sought a license from FERC to
build a small hydroelectric generating facility on Rock
Creek, a tributary of the South Fork of the American River
near Placerville, Calif. As approved and licensed by FERC,
the Rock Creek project diverts a portion of the stream
through a tunnel and penstocks to its turbine generators
and then returns the water to the American River about
one mile below the original diversion point. The facility
can generate up to 3,000 kilowatts and produces about
7,000 megawatt-hours of electricity annually. The project
is located partially on private land owned by the Rock
Creek Limited Partnership and partially on federally owned
land administered by the federal Bureau of Land
Management.
During the licensure proceedings, FERC, as required by
the governing law, advised California of the proposal and
considered materials on the environmental impacts of the
proposed project submitted by both the applicant and the
California Department of Fish and Game (CDFG). In 1983
FERC issued a license and required that the project main-
tain minimum instream flows (for protection of fish) of 11
cubic feet per second (cfs) from May through September,
and 15 cfs at all other times. These flow levels were the
ones contended for by the project applicant and were less
than the flows sought by CDFG.
Even before initiating the FERC licensure proceeding,
the project applicant sought to obtain the necessary state-
law water rights from the California State Water Resources
Control Board (SWRCB)under the state's prior appropria-
tion system. The SWRCB in 1984 granted the water rights
on an interim basis in reliance on the study of environ-
mental impacts provided by the applicant. The SWRCB,
however, expressly found that study to be "deficient" in
several regards and required the applicant to prepare a new
study in consultation with the CDFG. In 1987, after the
mandated study was completed, the SWRCB found that
the flow rates previously approved "would greatly reduce
the fishery habitat in Rock Creek" and revised the water
rights of the project to require instream flows of 60 cfs
from March through June and 30 cfs the remainder of the
year. These flows met with the approval of CDFG.
In 1986, while the state water-rights proceeding was still
underway, the project applicant petitioned FERC for an or-
der declaring that FERC's jurisdiction of the instrearn flow
issue was exclusive and could not be reconsidered by the
SWRCB. Just prior to the final SWRCBaction, FERC issued
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an order claiming exclusive authority, stating that "the es-
tablishment of minimum flows is beyond the reach of state
regulation ... [the SWRCBj has no authority to set mini-
mum flows for the project that conflict with those con-
tained in the license...." California then tried to intervene
in the FERC proceeding and obtain reconsideration of the
newest FERCruling. Intervention was allowed, but Califor-
nia's legal position, that section 27 of the Federal Power
Act preserves concurrent regulatory authority, was re-
jected. An appeal was taken to the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals, which affirmed the FERC position. 877 F.2d 743
(1989). The Supreme Court granted California's petition for
a writ of certiorari.
BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE
This case is significant as a matter of law and policy. The
precise legal issue it poses, whether FERC orders preempt
state streamflow requirements, is rather narrow, turning
on an interpretation of a single section of the Federal Power
Act that is not of exceedingly broad application. The le-
gal significance attaches because this case represents an-
other datum in the array of decisions that address natural
resource federalism. In the past two decades, the Supreme
Court has often allowed the states more room to regulate
federally controlled activities, but limits on state authority
do still exist.
Among these limits, First lou-a for over 40 years has
been a high-water mark of federal dominance, granting ex-
clusive power to the federal government to regulate the
waters used by hydroelectric generating facilities. Its rever-
sal or evisceration would be a signal victory for the states
in their effort to wrest control over natural resource policy
from the federal government. The downfall of First Iowa
would mean that in almost all natural-resource regulation
cases, the Supreme Court will presume the intent of Con-
gress is for concurrent state regulation.
As a practical matter, this case will have an effect on all
hydropower facilities. Although states may prove unwill-
ing to seek changes in established operating procedures
at federally licensed facilities because to do so would up-
set established patterns of use, many new small
hydropower facilities are being proposed nationwide. The
new interest in hydropower stems from the Public Utili-
ties Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA), which offers
substantial economic incentives for developers of small
hydroelectric generating facilities. FERC, for example,
received only 47 hydropower applications in 1977, but in
1981, a post-PURPA year, FERC received 1,752 such
applications.
The environmental consequences of so many dam
projects could be significant. The affected states feel them-
selves far better able to fly-speck the environmental con-
sequences of these hydropower proposals than the FERC
staff. FERC, of course, lacks the degree of localized exper-
tise that the states enjoy in regard to state water resources
and fish management programs. Additionally, FERC's en-
Issue No. 11
vironmental review is burdened by the large numbers of
hydropower applications, and FERC's staff resources must
also be expended in reviewing a host of other aspects of
each hydroelectric project and non-hydropower project
alike.
ARGUMENTS
For the State ofCalifornia (Counsel ofRecord, Roder-
ick E. Walston, Deputy Attorney General, 350 McAllister
Street, Suite 6000, San Francisco, CA 94102; telephone
(415) 557-3920):
1. Section 27 of the Federal Power Act provides that state
water laws apply to hydropower projects.
2. California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645 (1978), com-
pels a reinterpretation of section 27.
3. Congress has traditionally deferred to state water laws.
4. The legislative history of the Federal Power Act indi-
cates that Congress intended to defer to state water law.
5. First Iowa is distinguishable from this case.
6. FERCpreemption would impair the state's ability to al-
locate the limited water supply.
7. There is no conflict between state and federal regula-
tion in this case.
For Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (Coun-
sel ofRecord, Kenneth W Starr; Solicitor General, Depart-
ment ofJustice, Washington, DC 20530; telephone (202)
633-2217):
1. Section 27 does not reserve authority to the states to
veto the exercise of the Commission's authority to de-
termine whether and on what terms a hydropower proj-
ect would represent an appropriate use of water
resources.
2. The California minimum-flow requirements do not
constitute a proprietary right under California law and
are inconsistent with FERC's licensing authority.
For Rock Creek Limited Partnership (Counsel of Rec-
ord, Louis Touton, Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue, 255 S.
Grand Avenue, Suite 3000, Los Angeles, CA 90071; tele-
phone (213) 625-3939):
1. Supreme Court precedents establish that FERC has ex-
clusive authority to license and regulate hydroelectric
projects within its jurisdiction.
2. The legislative history of the relevant statutes discloses
a congressional intent to have federal regulation be
exclusive.
3. First Iowa is not inconsistent with California 1'. United
States.
4. This case does not involve the kind of "water rights"
that remain subject to state control under section 27
of the Federal Power Act.
AMICUS BRIEFS
This case sparked a good deal of support for both sides.
In support of California, Idaho filed a brief representing
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its view as well as that of the remaining 48 states. Other
briefs on that side were filed representing local govern-
mental units and environmental groups. Respondents
received support from numerous power-generating utili-
ties and a small number of other FERC license holders.
In Support of the State of California
1. The portion of First Iowa addressing the proper in-
terpretation of section 27 is dicta and misstates the in-
tent of Congress.
2. FERC's efforts to expand the scope of its regulatory
authority are inconsistent with the scope of action in-
tended for it by Congress.
3. In enacting the Federal Power Act, Congress recognized
that the public interest would best be served by state
regulation of water resources.
4. FERC cannot fairly and efficiently regulate streamflow
requirements on a national basis.
5. The jurisdiction of FERC and the states over by-pass
flows is concurrent.
In Support of FERC and the Rock Creek Limited
Partnership
1. First Iowa has served the interests of regulation of the
power industry predictably and well for 45 years and
should not now be abandoned.
2. The comprehensive regulatory scheme of the Federal
Power Act evinces an intent on the part of Congress
that FERC's license be the exclusive control of
hydropower facilities governed by the Act.
3. The 1986 Electric Consumers Protection Act confirms
that FERChas exclusive authority to establish minimum
flows.
4. Section 27 of the Federal Power Act is unlike section
8 of the Reclamation Act of 1902 that was interpreted
in California 1'. United States.
5. The state regulation here involved directly conflicts
with the FERC order and is therefore not a valid exer-
cise of any concurrent regulatory authority that Califor-
nia may enjoy.
6. The holding below can be affirmed on the basis that
the land involved in this case is federally reserved land
as to which federal authority is exclusive.
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